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FROM AUTOMATION TO AUTONOMY:
LEGAL AND ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITY
GAPS IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
INNOVATION
David Nersessian, JD, PhD* and Ruben Mancha, PhD**

Abstract
The increasing prominence of artificial intelligence (AI) systems
in daily life and the evolving capacity of these systems to process data
and act without human input raise important legal and ethical
concerns. This article identifies three primary AI actors in the value
chain (innovators, providers, and users) and three primary types of AI
(automation, augmentation, and autonomy). It then considers
responsibility in AI innovation from two perspectives: (i) strict liability
claims arising out of the development, commercialization, and use of
products with built-in AI capabilities (designated herein as “AI
artifacts”); and (ii) an original research study on the ethical practices
of developers and managers creating AI systems and AI artifacts.
The ethical perspective is important because, at the moment, the
law is poised to fall behind technological reality—if it hasn’t already.
Consideration of the liability issues in tandem with ethical
perspectives yields a more nuanced assessment of the likely
consequences and adverse impacts of AI innovation. Companies
should consider both legal and ethical strategies thinking about their
own liability and ways to limit it, as well as policymakers considering
AI regulation ex ante.
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I. Introduction
Artificial intelligence (AI) is a powerful technological driver of innovation and change. As noted by the founder and chairperson of the World
Economic Forum:
Already, artificial intelligence is all around us, from self-driving
cars and drones to virtual assistants and software that translate or
invest. Impressive progress has been made in AI in recent years,
driven by exponential increases in computing power and by the
availability of vast amounts of data, from software used to discover
new drugs to algorithms used to predict our cultural interests. Digital fabrication technologies, meanwhile, are interacting with the biological world on a daily basis. Engineers, designers, and architects
are combining computational design, additive manufacturing, materials engineering, and synthetic biology to pioneer a symbiosis between microorganisms, our bodies, the products we consume, and
1
even the buildings we inhabit.
2

AI systems decide what information we see on social media, brake our
3
vehicles when obstacles suddenly appear in our path, and move money
4
5
around with little human intervention. Apple’s Siri makes us laugh, and
1.
Klaus Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution: What It Means, How to Respond, WORLD ECON. FORUM (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/thefourth-industrial-revolution-what-it-means-and-how-to-respond.
2.
See, e.g., Jared Schroeder, Marketplace Theory in the Age of AI Communicators, 17
FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 22, 34 (2018) (noting that, for example, “Facebook’s news feed
algorithm decides which items, out of countless possibilities, appear atop users’ apps and
browsers when they use the social media outlet.”).
3.
See, e.g., Adam Thierer & Ryan Hagemann, Removing Roadblocks to Intelligent
Vehicles and Driverless Cars, 5 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 339, 344 (2015) (discussing
U.S. Department of Transportation’s five-part scheme on vehicle automation, noting that
“Level 1” automation, already in use today in autonomous vehicles, “include[d] electronic
stability control or pre-charged brakes, where the vehicle automatically assists with braking to
enable the driver to regain control of the vehicle or stop faster than by acting alone.”) (internal
citations omitted).
4.
See, e.g., Elizabeth Boison & Leo Tsao, Money Moves: Following the Money Beyond the Banking System, 67 DEP’T OF JUST. J. FED. L. & PRAC. 95, 111 (2019) (noting that
“Facebook has partnered with both MoneyGram and Western Union to integrate ‘chatbots’
into its messenger service, facilitating the initiation of international and domestic transfers by
Facebook users directly from Facebook’s interface.”). AI also powers high speed trading on
Wall Street, with mixed results. See, e.g., Thomas Belcastro, Getting on Board with Robots:
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6

Google helps us to remember our lives. AI also plays a growing role in the
physical world, facilitating human-digital interactions through IoT (Internet
7
8
9
of Things) interfaces and other kinds of robotic systems. Trends suggest
that the breadth and depth of AI utilization and integration into all aspects
of daily life will multiply rapidly as technology develops and costs continue
10
to drop.
AI already plays a critical role in the commercial sector. It is the driving
force behind the Fourth Industrial Revolution, which “is characterized by a
fusion of technologies that is blurring the lines between the physical, digital,
11
and biological spheres.” The economic impact of AI in this sector is estimated to be between $3.5–$5.8 trillion annually across multiple industries
12
and business functions. New efficiencies and innovation grounded in

How the Business Judgment Rule Should Apply to Artificial Intelligence Devices Serving as
Members of a Corporate Board, 4 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 263, 272 (2019) (noting positive returns from AI trading systems as well as the role of AI in “flash crashes” of the market).
5.
See e.g., Nick Bilton, Siri, Tell Me a Joke. No, a Funny One., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/13/fashion/siri-tell-me-a-joke-no-a-funny-one.html.
6.
See e.g., Joelle Renstrom, The Sinister Realities of Google’s Tear-Jerking Super
Bowl Commercial, SLATE (Feb. 3, 2020, 6:08 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2020/02
/google-assistant-super-bowl-commercial-loretta.html (criticizing Google’s “Loretta” Feb. 2,
2020 Super Bowl commercial).
7.
The U.S. Federal Trade Commission has defined IoT as an “interconnected environment where all manner of objects have a digital presence and the ability to communicate
with other objects and people.” Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission on Discussion Draft of H.R.__, Data Security and Breach Notification Act of 2015: Hearing on H.R.
1770 Before the Subcomm. on Com., Mfg. & Trade of the H. Comm. on Energy and Com.,
114th Cong. 6 (2015) (statement of Jessica Rich, Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission). Other countries take a similar approach. See, e.g., OFF. OF
PRIV. COMM’R OF CANADA, THE INTERNET OF THINGS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PRIVACY
ISSUES WITH A FOCUS ON THE RETAIL AND HOME ENVIRONMENTS 1 (2016),
https://www.priv.gc.ca/media/1808/iot_201602_e.pdf (defining IoT as “the networking of
physical objects connecting through the Internet.”).
8.
See, e.g., Bruno Zeller, Leon Trakman & Robert Walters, The Internet of Things –
The Internet of Things or of Human Objects? Mechanizing the New Social Order, 47
RUTGERS L. REV. 15, 34 (2020).
9.
See, e.g., Ugo Pagallo, What Robots Want: Autonomous Machines, Codes and New
Frontiers of Legal Responsibility, in HUMAN LAW AND COMPUTER LAW: COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES, 25 IUS GENTIUM: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON LAW AND JUSTICE 47,
47–65 (Mireille Hildebrandt & Jeanne Gaakeer eds., 2013) (considering the intersection of
robotics technology with legal principles and systems).
10.
See, e.g., RAYMOND PERRAULT ET AL., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE INDEX: 2019
ANNUAL REPORT (2019), https://hai.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/ai_index_2019_report.pdf
(tracking the pace of AI developments in areas such as technical progress, financial investment, research citations and higher education impacts).
11.
Schwab, supra note 1. For comparative purposes, “[t]he First Industrial Revolution
used water and steam power to mechanize production. The Second used electric power to create mass production. The Third used electronics and information technology to automate production.” Id.
12.
See JACQUES BUGHIN ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, NOTES FROM THE
AI FRONTIER: MODELING THE IMPACT OF AI ON THE WORLD ECONOMY 6 (2018),
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widespread AI adoption are predicted to grow the global economy by $15.7
13
trillion (14%) by 2030. Billions of dollars in market value of top companies such as Alphabet, Microsoft, Amazon, and Apple are linked to their use
14
of AI in products and services.
15
Despite its widespread economic benefits, the new AI “arms race”
presents unique challenges for the legal system. The law always has struggled to keep pace with technological innovation and often finds itself be16
hind the curve. With AI innovation in particular, the legal system must
“embrace change and innovation as an imperative in a journey towards an
17
ever-shifting horizon.” There have been many proposals from a wide
18
19
range of stakeholders—including executive and legislative policymakers

https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Featured%20Insights/Artificial%20Intelligenc
e/Notes%20from%20the%20frontier%20Modeling%20the%20impact%20of%20AI%20on%2
0the%20world%20economy/MGI-Notes-from-the-AI-frontier-Modeling-the-impact-of-AIon-the-world-economy-September-2018.pdf?shouldIndex=false. These include the core business practices of: (i) customer acquisition, retention and service, as well as pricing and promotions (~$1.2–2.3 trillion); (ii) operations and supply chain management (~$1.2–1.9 trillion);
and (iii) business optimization, risk management, and automation tasks (~$1.3 trillion). Id.
13.
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, SIZING THE PRIZE: WHAT’S THE REAL VALUE OF AI
FOR YOUR BUSINESS AND HOW CAN YOU CAPITALISE? 3–4 (2017), https://www.pwc.com
/gx/en/issues/analytics/assets/pwc-ai-analysis-sizing-the-prize-report.pdf.
14.
See Google Leads in the Race to Dominate Artificial Intelligence, ECONOMIST
(Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.economist.com/business/2017/12/07/google-leads-in-the-race-todominate-artificial-intelligence.
15.
See generally Peter Asaro, What Is an “Artificial Intelligence Arms Race” Anyway?, 15 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 45 (2019) (discussing the “global artificial intelligence (AI) arms race”).
16.
E.g., Edward A. Parson, Social Control of Technological Risks: The Dilemma of
Knowledge and Control in Practice, and Ways to Surmount It, 64 UCLA L. REV. 464, 471
(2016) (noting that “[r]egulation . . . often lags behind innovation”).
17.
Daryl Lim, AI & IP: Innovation & Creativity in an Age of Accelerated Change, 52
AKRON L. REV. 813, 874 (2019).
18.
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,859, 84 Fed. Reg. 3967 (Feb. 11, 2019). See also Request for Comments on a Draft Memorandum to the Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies, “Guidance for Regulation of Artificial Intelligence Applications,” 85 Fed. Reg.
1825 (Jan. 13, 2020) (requesting comments on draft policy statement relating to legal, regulatory and non-regulatory oversight of the development and use of AI applications outside of
the Federal government).
For a recent analysis of current governmental use of AI, see DAVID FREEMAN
ENGSTROM ET AL., GOVERNMENT BY ALGORITHM: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 6 (2020), https://law.stanford.edu/education/only-at-sls/lawpolicy-lab/practicums-2018-2019/administering-by-algorithm-artificial-intelligence-in-theregulatory-state/acus-report-for-administering-by-algorithm-artificial-intelligence-in-theregulatory-state/#slsnav-report (studying “AI use at the 142 most significant federal departments, agencies, and sub-agencies” and providing “cross-cutting analyses of the institutional,
legal, and policy challenges raised by agency use of AI”).
19.
See, e.g., H.R. Res. 5356, 115th Cong. (2018) (proposing independent commission
to consider artificial intelligence, machine learning, and related technologies from a national
security standpoint); H.R. Res. 4625, 115th Cong. (2017) (proposing a coordinated national
strategy for developing AI). For additional details on Congressional engagement with AI top-
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in the United States and abroad, state lawmakers, regulatory bodies, in23
24
dustry organizations, and civil society groups —on how to address the
unique legal implications presented by the creation and use of artificial intelligence. A wide body of scholarship is emerging around such varied digi25
tal innovation topics as virtual and augmented reality, sui generis regulato26
ry systems for AI implementation, granting formal legal personality to AI
27
systems, and the role of AI in legal practice and the administration of jus28
tice.
Rather than add an incremental voice to an already-crowded chorus,
this article takes an entirely different approach in order to arrive at a fresh
perspective. It combines doctrinal analysis with an original research study,
focusing on two complementary dimensions of AI innovation that have not

ics,
see
CONGRESSIONAL
ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE
CAUCUS,
https://artificialintelligencecaucus-olson.house.gov/members (last visited Feb. 15, 2020).
20.
See, e.g., ACCESS NOW, MAPPING REGULATORY PROPOSALS FOR ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE IN EUROPE (2018), https://www.accessnow.org/cms/assets/uploads/2018/11
/mapping_regulatory_proposals_for_AI_in_EU.pdf.
21.
States have taken different approaches to AI-powered autonomous vehicles, for
example. See, e.g., Ben Husch & Anne Teigen, Regulating Autonomous Vehicles, NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Apr. 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research
/transportation/regulating-autonomous-vehicles.aspx (noting that 28 states had introduced legislation to regulate autonomous vehicles).
22.
The use of AI in medical devices, for example, has drawn scrutiny from federal
regulators. See, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning in Software as a Medical Device (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/software-medical-device-samd/artificial-intelligence-and-machine-learning-softwaremedical-device (implications of AI in medical devices).
23.
Tom Simonite, How Tech Companies Are Shaping the Rules Governing AI, WIRED
(May 16, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/how-tech-companies-shaping-rulesgoverning-ai (discussing lobbying by industry group representing Microsoft, Facebook, and
Apple around AI regulation). See also Yochai Benkler, Don’t Let Industry Write the Rules for
AI, 569 NATURE 161, 161 (2019), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-01413-1 (noting that “[i]ndustry has mobilized to shape the science, morality and laws of artificial intelligence” and arguing that governments, consumers, and other stakeholders should take an active role in ensuring that industry concerns did not dominate the debate).
24.
For consideration of the positive and negative human rights implications of AI,
compare Salil Shetty, Artificial Intelligence for Good, AMNESTY INT’L (June 9, 2017),
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/06/artificial-intelligence-for-good, with Steven
Melendez, AI Could Bring “Nightmare Scenarios,” Warns Amnesty International, FAST CO.
(June
13,
2018),
https://www.fastcompany.com/40584711/ai-could-bring-nightmarescenarios-warns-amnesty-international.
25.
See generally Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Law, Virtual Reality, and Augmented Reality, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (2018).
26.
See, e.g., Edmund Mokhtarian, The Bot Legal Code: Developing a Legally Compliant Artificial Intelligence, 21 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 145, 192 (2018).
27.
See, e.g., Shawn Bayern, The Implications of Modern Business-Entity Law for the
Regulation of Autonomous Systems, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 93, 94 (2015).
28.
See, e.g., Richard M. Re & Alicia Solow-Niederman, Developing Artificially Intelligent Justice, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 242, 246 (2019); Harry Surden, Artificial Intelligence
and Law: An Overview, 35 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1305, 1326–35 (2019).
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yet been considered vis-à-vis each other: the legal liability arising out of AI
innovation and deployment and the ethical development of AI in the first
place. It frames questions of products liability from a new perspective in
two ways. First, it focuses on three key actors involved in bringing products
with built-in AI capabilities (herein designated “AI artifacts”) to market: innovators, providers, and users. Second, it considers the relative sophistication of the technologies in question, noting important differences in AI automation, augmentation, and autonomy.
The reframing of liability is only one part of the picture. In business environments, principles of ethical responsibility work in conjunction with liability avoidance as powerful forces in shaping both corporate and individ29
ual behavior. This article discusses findings from a new study on the
ethical perspectives of AI developers and managers in the creation and deployment of AI technologies. Consideration of both perspectives yields a
more nuanced assessment of the likely consequences and impacts of AI innovation, both for companies thinking about how to limit their own potential liability and for policymakers considering AI regulation ex ante.
Proposals for the regulation of AI tend to be highly context-dependent,
varying considerably depending on what objectives the regulatory scheme is
30
intended to achieve. Regulating AI for the purpose of personal safety, for
example, is very different from schemes aimed at protecting AI-generated
31
creative works through copyright, which in turn differ markedly from
32
broad regimes regulating AI as an aspect of wider social policies. This article focuses on questions of civil liability in tort for physical injury or

29.
See, e.g., Milton C. Regan, Jr., Risky Business, 94 GEO. L.J.1957, 1966 (2006)
(“[C]onceptualizing ethics as a matter of avoiding liability can influence these dispositions,
attitudes, and motives, and, therefore, how someone exercises her discretion . . . . Risk management conceives of ethical and legal provisions as a minefield of potential sources of liability.”).
30.
See Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges, Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353, 359–60 (2016) (discussing
the challenges of defining AI in the context of a proposed regulatory regime to govern its
use); see also id. at 388–98 (discussing tort liability and proposing a safety certification system for AI).
31.
See Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rembrandt: Artificial Intelligence, Copyright, and Accountability in the 3A Era—The Human-Like Authors Are Already Here—A New
Model, 2017 MICH. ST. L. REV. 659, 673 (2017) (“There are as many definitions as there are
types of AI systems. John McCarthy, who coined the term ‘Artificial Intelligence,’ did not
provide an independent definition, while scholars Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig suggested
almost ten different definitions. Definitions generally vary according to the targeted subject,
emphasizing different aspects of AI systems”); see also Kalin Hristov, Artificial Intelligence
and the Copyright Dilemma, 57 IDEA 431, 431 (arguing that programmers should receive
authorship rights for AI creations).
32.
See, e.g., European Parliament Resolution of 16 February 2017 with Recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics, EUR. PARL. DOC. P8TA(2017)0051 (2017) ¶¶ 49–65 (noting prospective need for liability regimes to cover next
generation AI and robotic systems).
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property damage caused by AI artifacts. Questions of criminal liability are
not addressed here, though it certainly is possible for malicious innovators
to use AI artifacts to violate criminal laws (e.g., using robots to rob a bank,
drones to assault an enemy, advanced “peeping tom” technologies to violate
33
privacy, etc.).
Another working assumption here is that the AI artifacts in question are
not intentionally designed to cause injury to human beings. In such cases,
AI-enabled devices that harm someone actually are not defective—they are
operating as intended. Thus, our analysis excludes AI artifacts such as socalled “killer robots” designed for military purposes, even when those products make errors that end up killing the wrong army’s soldiers or civilian
34
noncombatants. Our discussion also excludes less direct forms of AIenabled “injury,” such as the use of COMPAS, an evidence-based risk management system that predicts recidivism from a defendant’s interview and
criminal file, the results of which are used by judges in deciding appropriate
35
sentences of incarceration.
The article is organized in five parts. Part I sets the scene by describing
the role of AI in society today, as well as the role that it increasingly will
play in the future as technology advances at a rapid pace. Part II offers a
more nuanced approach to thinking about AI systems by positing three primary classifications of AI artifacts according to their functioning:
(i) Automation AI: Characterized by known pathways and defined
characteristics, replacing known and repetitive human activities
(e.g. sales chatbots, or repetitive tasks in manufacturing).
(ii) Augmentation AI: Designs based on known interactions with
human operators—helping workers to recall and analyze data
but leaving judgment and strategizing to necessary human
counterparts (e.g. surgical robots, or the augmented reality
game Pokémon Go).
(iii) Autonomy AI: Machine learning based on unknown interactions
and environments, where the machine itself makes important,
high stakes decisions—only primitive forms currently exist
(e.g., today’s “self-driving” vehicles), but autonomy will be the

33.
See, e.g., Rachel Charney, Can Androids Plead Automatism? – A Review of When
Robots Kill: Artificial Intelligence under the Criminal Law by Gabriel Hallevy, 73 U.
TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 69 (2015); see also Gabriel Hallevy, The Basic Models of Criminal
Liability of AI Systems and Outer Circles (June 11, 2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3402527.
34.
See, e.g., Bonnie Docherty, Heed the Call: A Moral and Legal Imperative to Ban
Killer Robots, HUM. RIGHTS WATCH (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/08/21
/heed-call/moral-and-legal-imperative-ban-killer-robots.
35.
See, e.g., State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016) (holding that a circuit
court’s consideration of a COMPAS risk assessment at sentencing does not violate a defendant’s rights to due process).
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inevitable result of AI increasingly gaining the ability to deal
with unstructured data and complex settings.
Part III considers strict products liability law as applied to AI artifacts.
When a product causes injury, normally all distribution chain participants
can be held liable—including creators, designers, manufacturers, suppliers
of component parts or designs, distributors, retailers, owners, and operators.
For greater clarity, this writing simplifies the liability construct to focus
more precisely on the three primary types of actors in the distribution chain
for AI artifacts:
(i) Innovators: Creators of either custom-designed or open-source
AI algorithms and systems incorporated into AI artifacts. Innovators may be nonprofit actors (e.g., research universities) or
individuals as well as corporate entities. The AI itself may be
brand new or a refinement of existing AI (e.g., modifying code
from an open-source AI library).
(ii) Providers: Manufacturers who assemble various AI technologies and other components into products that may either be tactile (e.g., self-driving car) or virtual (e.g., high-frequency trading program), and the distributors and retailers who help to
bring those products to the end-user market.
(iii) Users: Owners who purchase AI-enabled products and those
who operate them on behalf of the purchasers, which can be
individual consumers with personal uses or business entities in
a business-to-business setting.
Part III then discusses special liability issues associated with IoT devices, which incorporate AI artifacts into a variety of household and consumer
products. This analysis reveals that the liability risks associated with certain
types of AI for certain AI actors are predictable and understandable, while
others are inherently unforeseeable and unknown, and thus are uninsurable.
This has significant implications for the current and future development of
AI artifacts, as discussed in Part IV.
Part IV considers how the absence of clear liability standards (a legal
responsibility gap) might impact the development of AI in the private sector. It notes that the various actors in the AI value chain will seek to allocate
liability and indemnity risks among themselves through purchasing contracts or intellectual property license regimes. This may mean that only the
largest companies will be able to take on the potentially unlimited liability
risk at issue. This in turn may stifle AI entrepreneurship at smaller scales or
channel innovation to the types of AI artifacts most suitable to the needs of
large corporate concerns.
Part IV also considers the role played by ethics in the use and development of AI. It discusses a new research study on the perceived responsibility
of AI professionals in the development and use of AI innovations. This
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study reveals a clear gap in ethical responsibility—namely, that although
nearly everyone agrees that ethics and responsibility are critically important
in AI innovation, nearly everyone also agrees that ethics and responsibility
are someone else’s job. Part IV then discusses the implications of the legal
and ethical responsibility gaps in AI innovation and offers recommendations to address them. Part V concludes with final thoughts and topics for
future consideration.

II. Types of Artificial Intelligence
As discussed herein, AI refers to computational algorithms based on
statistical and logical principles emulating human cognitive processes to
engage in data-driven tasks: acquiring and processing data, actuating physical components, learning (including learning how to learn), and solving
36
problems. Put another way:
[T]o be considered [AI] . . . a computer system or robot must meet
certain benchmarks: it must (1) communicate using natural language, (2) store information, (3) engage in automated reasoning
(i.e., logic) to evaluate stored information to answer inquiries, (4)
adapt to new situations and extrapolate patterns, (5) contain com37
puter vision, and (6) include robotics functions.
AI creates value by emulating human cognitive processes, mainly those
rooted in quantitative analysis and logic in narrow settings. All other cognitive processes, particularly those rooted in gut feeling, intuition, and emotion, are well beyond the capabilities of the most sophisticated AI systems.
Common innovations in AI technology thus broadly fall into the categories
of computer vision, virtual agents, natural language processing, autonomous
38
vehicles, or smart robotics. The most complex AI systems frequently incorporate multiple types of AI innovations and combine them with other
technologies into comprehensive solutions. However, for analytic purposes
here, we posit three primary classifications of AI according to its function:
automation, augmentation, and autonomy.

36.
See Scherer, supra note 30, at 360 (noting eight different functional definitions of
AI “organized into four categories: thinking humanly, acting humanly, thinking rationally,
and acting rationally. Over time, the importance of each of these definitional concepts has
waxed and waned within the AI research community.”).
37.
Nancy B. Talley, Imagining the Use of Intelligent Agents and Artificial Intelligence
in Academic Law Libraries, 108 L. LIBR. J. 383, 387 (2016) (citing STUART J. RUSSELL &
PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN APPROACH 2–3 (2d ed. 2003)).
38.
See Artificial Intelligence News, BUS. INSIDER, https://www.businessinsider.com
/artificial-intelligence (last visited Feb. 17, 2020) (discussing various developments and trends
in AI).
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Automation AI has found a home in production lines and warehouses,
where many tasks are repetitive and fully identified in advance. It is also
finding its way into white-collar settings, where its information processing
39
capabilities help knowledge workers in decision-making processes. As AI
learns to deal with complexity and uncertainty, it becomes increasingly
helpful in the completion of ambiguous tasks, which includes dealing with
humans in unstructured contexts. Sales chatbots are an example of automation, as they replace known and repetitive activities traditionally completed
40
by salespeople using a text-based interface. Factory assembly and ware41
house storage and retrieval robots are additional examples.
Augmentation AI helps workers to recall and analyze data or perform
42
precision tasks, leaving judgment and strategizing to a human counterpart.
Workers in industrial settings, for example, find information aids on aug43
mented reality helmets in support of their decisions. So do players of the
augmented reality game Pokémon Go. Often, augmentation AI is far more
sophisticated and high stakes, as for example when surgery is assisted by
44
the Da Vinci surgical robot. Nevertheless, the surgeon remains squarely in
control, albeit with the physician’s capabilities augmented (enhanced) by
45
the AI artifact.
Autonomy AI will be the inevitable result of AI gaining the ability to
deal with unstructured data and complex environments. Emerging examples
include delivery robots and “Level 4” (i.e., fully autonomous) self-driving
46
vehicles, although autonomous AI today remains far from the hypothetical

39.
See, e.g., Arup Das, There’s a Bot for That, A.B.A.: L. PRACT. TODAY (Dec. 14,
2018), https://www.lawpracticetoday.org/article/lawyers-robotic-process-automation (discussing use of robotic process automation in legal practice).
40.
See, e.g., Steven Brykman, Why We Desperately Need an AI Chatbot Law, Before
We All Get Taken for a Ride, CIO: THE BRYKMAN PREDICAMENT (June 13, 2018, 8:53 AM),
https://www.cio.com/article/3281375/why-we-desperately-need-an-ai-chatbot-law.html.
41.
See, e.g., Nick Wingfield, As Amazon Pushes Forward with Robots, Workers Find
New Roles, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/10
/technology/amazon-robots-workers.html.
42.
MIT TECH. REV. INSIGHTS, Augmenting Human Intelligence, MIT TECH. REV.
(June
13,
2016),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601678/augmenting-humanintelligence.
43.
See Garrett Reim, Augmented Reality Helmet Heads into Industrial, L.A. BUS. J.
(Sept. 2, 2016), https://labusinessjournal.com/news/2016/sep/02/augmented-reality-helmetheads-industrial.
44.
See Tim Lane, A Short History of Robotic Surgery, 100 ANNALS ROYAL COLL.
SURGEONS ENG. 5–7 (Supp. 2018).
45.
See Sumathi Reddy, Robot-Assisted Surgery Costs More but May Not Be Better,
WALL ST. J.: YOUR HEALTH (Oct. 30, 2017, 1:11 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/robotassisted-surgery-costs-more-but-may-not-be-better-1509383463.
46.
See Thierer & Hagemann, supra note 3, at 344 (“Level 4: Full Self-Driving Automation. The vehicle is designed to perform all safety-critical driving functions and monitor
roadway conditions for an entire trip. Such a design anticipates that the driver will provide
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broad AI—the one capable of completing numerous cognitive tasks and
called artificial general intelligence (AGI).
The differences between the three types of AI artifacts are summarized
in Table 1:

Table 1. Comparison of AI Automation, Augmentation and
Autonomy.
Automation

Augmentation

Autonomy

Description

AI artifact completes
well-defined and
repetitive tasks
following its
programming.

AI artifact supports
human worker in
completing semistructured and
unstructured tasks.

AI artifact operates by
following its
programming, learning
from its experiences,
and adapting to new
circumstances.

Scope of action

Replaces humans in
known & understood
activities. Can be
applied to scenarios not
yet contemplated but
which are understood.

Supports humans in
efficiently completing
known & understood
activities, discovering
new information,
patterns & connections;
helping to find solutions
to problems which are
known but not
understood.

Independently
performs understood
activities in
anticipated or novel
scenarios (knownunknowns). Can learn
to act in scenarios not
yet understood.

Human
interaction

Direct supervision of
operational process and
outputs of the AI
artifact.

Limited visibility into
the operational
processes completed by
the AI artifact. Outputs
of the AI artifact are
considered by the
human.

No visibility into the
operational processes
completed by the AI
artifact. Outputs of the
AI artifact impact the
human as the
anticipated or
unanticipated result of
the functioning.

Anticipation of
failure

Error types and rates can be estimated.

Error types and rates
cannot be anticipated
in novel scenarios.

destination or navigation input, but is not expected to be available for control at any time during the trip. This includes both occupied and unoccupied vehicles.”).
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III. Legal Responsibility Frameworks
47

When it comes to “defective” products, liability in any category (innovator, provider, user) will be based on three primary grounds: (i) when
the product created deviates from its intended design (manufacturing defect), (ii) when the product should have been designed differently to avoid a
foreseeable risk of harm (design defect), or (iii) when companies fail to provide instructions or warnings that could have avoided foreseeable risks of
48
harm (failure to warn). In all three cases, the plaintiff will assert that the
49
product in question was “unreasonably dangerous” due to a defect of some
50
kind. Each involves a fact-specific inquiry into the nature of the product
and injury in question, as well as the circumstances in which the injury oc51
curred.
52
Manufacturing defects (for which companies are strictly liable) occur
when products do not comport with the manufacturer’s intended design
(e.g., if a data processing or coding error causes the AI to behave differently
53
than it should). The basis of liability is the product itself, which necessarily includes all of its component parts. Manufacturers thus can be held liable
for product defects, even where the defect arises from a component manu54
factured by others. However, in these cases the incorporated component
itself must actually be defective. The original creator of the component is

47.
There must be some cost or injury beyond the loss associated with the product itself
not meeting specifications. See, e.g., Sacramento Reg’l Transit Dist. v. Grumman Flxible, 158
Cal. App. 3d 289, 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that a merchant could not assert a claim
“in products liability for physical injury to its property where that injury consists of nothing
more than the product defect upon which liability is founded”).
48.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 (AM. L. INST. 1998).
49.
Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. v. DeVries, 139 S. Ct. 986, 1000 n.7 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1)(b) (AM. L. INST. 1965))
(noting that “[u]nder traditional tort principles, the seller of a defective, ‘unreasonably dangerous’ product may be liable to an injured user if the product ‘is expected to and does reach
the user . . . without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.’”).
50.
“Whether a product is unreasonably dangerous is a distinct inquiry and must be
established whether the claim is based on a manufacturing defect, a design defect, or a defective warning.” Kaiser v. Johnson & Johnson, 947 F.3d 996, 1008 (7th Cir. 2020).
51.
See, e.g., id. (quoting Koske v. Townsend Eng’g Co., 551 N.E.2d 437, 440–41 (Ind.
1990)) (“To decide whether a product is unreasonably dangerous, the fact-finder may consider
several factors, including ‘the reasonably anticipated knowledge, perception, appreciation,
circumstances, and behavior of expected users.’”).
52.
Gregory C. Keating, Products Liability as Enterprise Liability, 10 J. TORT L. 41, 95
(2017) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. a) (“Under both
§402A and the Third Restatement, liability for manufacturing defects is strict enterprise liability.”).
53.
Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1700,
1709 (2003).
54.
See, e.g., Brocklesby v. United States, 767 F.2d 1288, 1296 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that “[a] seller is strictly liable for injuries caused by a defective product even though the
defect originated from a component part manufactured by another party”).
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not liable for injuries subsequently caused when another product manufacturer makes the poor choice to incorporate a component and task it to do
55
something for which it is ill-suited.
Design defects, on the other hand, occur when there is no deviation
from the manufacturing plan but where the design itself is flawed or the
product could have been designed more carefully to lessen the risk of using
56
it. Design defects can be established in one of two ways. The first option
allows plaintiffs to recover by showing that “the product failed to perform
as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or
reasonably foreseeable manner” (known as the “consumer expectations
57
test”). Plaintiffs can prove their case using circumstantial evidence of how
the product behaved in a particular situation to show that it must have been
58
defective when causing their harm.
Alternatively, plaintiffs can establish a design defect by proving that a
product should have been designed more safely in light of “the gravity of
the danger posed by the challenged design, the likelihood that such danger
would occur, the mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative design, the financial cost of an improved design, and the adverse consequences to the
product and to the consumer that would result from an alternative design”
59
(known as the “risk-benefit” test). This test seeks to balance commercial
and consumer interests. As one court described it:
A “risk-utility” analysis best protects both the manufacturer and the
consumer. It does not create a duty on the manufacturer to create a
completely safe product. Creating such a product is often impossible or prohibitively expensive. Instead, a manufacturer is charged
with the duty to make its product reasonably safe, regardless of
60
whether the plaintiff is aware of the product’s dangerousness.
Finally, manufacturers have a duty to warn about the risks associated
with using their products. The duty arises “when the manufacturer ‘knows
55.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 5 cmt. a (“If the component
is not itself defective, it would be unjust and inefficient to impose liability solely on the
ground” that others “utiliz[e] the component in a manner that renders the integrated product
defective.”).
56.
Id.; see also Estate of Alex v. T-Mobile US, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 3d 723, 732 (N.D.
Tex. 2018) (holding that plaintiff sufficiently alleged claim of design defect under Texas law
by alleging that mobile device software was defectively designed because it failed to guard
against software tampering that caused 9-1-1 telecommunications system to be congested and
led to calls based on real emergencies, like babysitter’s call regarding injured child, to be
placed on hold).
57.
Bookhamer v. Sunbeam Prods., Inc., 913 F. Supp. 2d 809, 818 (N.D. Cal. 2012)
(citing Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 457 (Cal. 1978)).
58.
Id. (citing Barker, 573 P.2d at 454).
59.
Id. (citing Barker, 573 P.2d at 455).
60.
Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248, 256 (Miss. 1993) (footnote omitted).
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or has reason to know’ that its product ‘is or is likely to be dangerous for the
use for which it is supplied’ and the manufacturer ‘has no reason to believe’
61
that the product’s users will realize that danger.” This duty to warn extends only to the known aspects of the product itself—not to unanticipated
situations where one company’s product is incorporated into another’s
62
product in an unexpected way.
Tort liability for defective products also can be predicated on the doctrine of negligence. “In plain English, a person suing for negligence alleges
that the defendant owed her a duty of reasonable care and injured her by
63
breaching that duty.” Although negligence claims likely would play a role
64
in lawsuits arising out of defective AI artifacts, in order to facilitate a
sharper focus on the product itself, negligence theories and contractual war65
ranties under the Uniform Commercial Code are not discussed further
here. This is not to say that such alternative claims are unimportant. Indeed,
it is a virtual certainty that claims arising under all three theories would be
66
asserted simultaneously in any lawsuit arising out of an AI artifact. How-

61.
Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. v. DeVries, 139 S. Ct. 986, 993 (2019) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388). “[W]arnings also may be needed to inform users
and consumers of nonobvious and not generally known risks that unavoidably inhere in using
or consuming the product.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2, cmt. I. Users also may
have to be advised when there are safer ways to use a product. See, e.g., Liriano v. Hobart
Corp., 170 F.3d 264, 270–71 (2d Cir. 1999) (discussing two categories of required warnings—the first covering the ways in which a product may be dangerous and the second instructing on safer ways to use that dangerous product).
62.
Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 993–94 (2019) (noting “foreseeability that
the product may be used with another product or part that is likely to be dangerous is not
enough to trigger a duty to warn. But a manufacturer does have a duty to warn when its product requires incorporation of a part and the manufacturer knows or has reason to know that the
integrated product is likely to be dangerous for its intended uses.”).
63.
John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the
Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657, 658 (2001).
64.
Broadly speaking, “[t]ort law imposes ‘a duty to exercise reasonable care’ on those
whose conduct presents a risk of harm to others.” Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 993
(citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 (AM. L. INST.
2010)).
65.
See U.C.C. § 2-318 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) [hereinafter
U.C.C.] (on third party beneficiaries of warranties express or implied); see also U.C.C. §§ 2313 (express warranties), 2-314 (implied warranties of merchantability), 2-315 (implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose), 2-316 (governing how warranties can be modified
and disclaimed). For more details on contractual liability, see Timothy Davis, UCC Breach of
Warranty and Contract Claims: Clarifying the Distinction, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 783 (2009)
(addressing “the distinction between breach of warranty and breach of contract claims” under
the UCC); see also William L. Stallworth, An Analysis of Warranty Claims Instituted by NonPrivity Plaintiffs in Jurisdictions That Have Adopted Uniform Commercial Code Section 2318 (Alternatives B & C), 27 AKRON L. REV. 197 (1993) (discussing warranty claims and defenses under Article 2 of the UCC).
66.
Claims seeking redress for injuries allegedly caused by sophisticated medical devices are a good analogy. See, e.g., Tyree v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 54 F. Supp. 3d 501, 515 (S.D. W.
Va. 2014) (plaintiff’s complaint alleging negligence, strict liability for design and manufactur-
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ever, there are a number of analytic benefits to focusing more precisely here
on strict liability and leaving it to future scholarship to address the application of other compensation doctrines to AI artifacts.
First, the focus on strict products liability law makes it unnecessary to
contemplate the separate but critical question of whether a legal “duty” exists for AI-related activities under common law or legislation. Duty is a pre67
requisite for all negligence claims, and the scope of that duty is critical in
68
determining whether the compensation gateway remains open or closed.
But it is not necessary here to get bogged down in the theoretical quagmire
of where a legal duty might come from in relation to AI artifacts (meaning,
whether the duty is an outgrowth of traditional tort principles or some other
69
form of sui generis evolution).
Second, the focus on strict liability eliminates the challenges associated
70
with contractual disclaimers as well as the complications that can arise
when multiple causes of action “become entangled with the structure of
products liability actions and with different limitation periods and accrual
rules applying to warranty, strict products liability and negligence ac71
tions.” This allows for more analytic consistency across different types of
AI artifacts.
Finally, the focus on strict liability alone presents the clearest opportunity for policy consideration of the potential benefits and drawbacks of
widespread AI innovation and adoption. Strict products liability focuses on

ing defects, strict liability for failure to warn, and breach of express warranty); McPhee v.
DePuy Orthopedics, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 2d 451, 455 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (alternative claims including strict liability, negligence, and breach of express and implied warranties).
67.
See, e.g., Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 3d 158, 164–65
(E.D.N.Y. 2019) (holding that it was necessary for a plaintiff to establish that the defendant
owed the plaintiff a legal duty before the defendant could be held liable for negligence).
68.
See, e.g., David G. Owen, The Five Elements of Negligence, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1671, 1672 (2007) (summarizing the traditional formulation of the elements of a negligence
claim—duty, breach, causation, and damages).
69.
For example, whether Autonomous AI can have its own legal obligations. See, e.g.,
Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1231,
1248–53 (1992) (in the context of capacity to uphold legal duties associated with trust administration, noting that an AI artifact could not be deemed to sufficiently capable of exercising
judgment and discretion for purposes of legal liability unless it was proven capable of responding capably to unexpected changes in circumstance, exercising proper moral judgment
and fairness, and making good decisions in the resolution of legal issues and disputes). For
updated consideration of Solum’s early theories and predictions, see generally Dina Moussa
& Garrett Windle, From Deep Blue to Deep Learning: A Quarter Century of Progress for
Artificial Minds, 1 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 72 (2016).
70.
See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, Implied Warranty, Products Liability, and the Boundary
Between Contract and Tort, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 469 (1997) (noting distinctions between implied warranty and products liability standards).
71.
Samuel J. M. Donnelly & Mary Ann Donnelly, Commercial Law, 47 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 379, 398 (1997).
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whether a product—negligently designed or not —is “unreasonably dan73
gerous” to those with whom it subsequently comes into contact. As one
author put it,
When products are involved, negligence liability is liability for
harms that would not have happened given reasonably safe product
design and reasonable product warnings. By contrast, enterprise liability is liability for harms that flow from an activity’s (or an enterprise’s) characteristic risks, whether or not those risks should
74
have been eliminated through the exercise of reasonable care.
This places the focus squarely on the risks associated with the inherent
nature of AI artifacts themselves, together with the behavior that the law
should require innovators, providers, and users to engage in in order to mitigate those risks.

A. Products Liability Law and AI Artifacts
The question of assessing legal responsibility for AI innovations is important because the law is currently poised to fall behind technological reality, if it hasn’t done so already. As discussed below, the liability risks associated with certain types of AI will be inherently unforeseeable. The
various participants in the AI value chain undoubtedly will seek to allocate
potential liability risks among themselves through purchasing contracts or
intellectual property licensing regimes. They cannot, however, limit their
collective liability when an AI artifact causes an indivisible harm to a third
party outside the value chain.
Fundamental differences in the three primary categories of AI artifacts
discussed above will lead to different types of legal responsibility for firms
involved in bringing them to market. When a defective product causes
harm, the law generally seeks to apportion liability based upon the relative
fault of the actors involved (which includes injured parties who contribute

72.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2) (providing for liability even
where “the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product”).
73.
See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963)
(holding that a party need not prove negligence to recover in products liability; rather, a plaintiff need only establish that a product was “defective” and that the defect caused the injuries in
question). See also Keating, supra note 52, at 80 (discussing liability for selling a “product in
a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer”) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1)).
74.
Keating, supra note 52, at 78. Absolute safety is not required. See, e.g., Miller v.
Dvornik, 501 N.E.2d 160, 165 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (refusing to hold motorcycle manufacturer
liable for injuries from vehicle accident because the injuries in question arose from the inherent risks in operating a motorcycle, which were obvious to the user).
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75

to their own injuries—say, by misusing a product). An important consideration is which parties were best positioned to prevent the harm in the first
76
place—typically the product’s creators and sellers. All of the actors in a
77
product’s distribution chain can be held liable for injuries caused. This
usually includes:
•
•
•

Creators/designers of a product or suppliers of component parts
provided to manufacturers;
Product manufacturers, who select and assemble a variety of
component parts according to specific designs in order to create a product that meets a specific market need; and
Distributors and retailers, ranging from mere sellers of “boxed”
products from manufacturers (e.g., retailers), to players with a
specific role in “prepping” the product for market and selling
end users on its benefits (e.g., car dealers), to purveyors of sophisticated equipment who are heavily involved in helping users with product selection and in educating them on proper use
78
(e.g., medical devices).

Products liability theories cannot be used to secure compensation from
79
end-users or the occasional seller. In cases where third parties are injured,
claims against owners, who held either title or a leasehold interest in the
product at the time it causes injury, and operators, who actually were using
the product at the time the injury occurs, most likely would be brought under a negligence theory. This makes sense because any wrongful conduct
that owners and operators engage in relates to how the product was maintained and/or used at the time of the accident, rather than how the product
was designed or manufactured. In a similar vein, negligence would play
some role in the apportionment of liability when human error combines

75.
See, e.g., Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248, 256 (Miss. 1993) (“In
balancing the utility of the product against the risk it creates, an ordinary person’s ability to
avoid the danger by exercising care is also weighed.”).
76.
See, e.g., Greenman, 377 P.2d at 901 (noting that the purpose of imposing strict
liability is “to insure [sic] that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne
by the manufacturer that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons
who are powerless to protect themselves.”).
77.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 1 cmt. c (“One engaged in
the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells or distributes a defective
product is subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by the defect.”). While
the focus here is on U.S. law, similar rules apply in other countries—throughout Europe, for
example. See Council Directive 85/374, art. 6, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29 (EC) (“A product is defective when it does not provide the safety a person is entitled to expect.”).
78.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. f (noting that liability “applies to any person engaged in the business of selling products for use or consumption. It
therefore applies to any manufacturer of such a product, to any wholesaler or retail dealer or
distributor”).
79.
See id.
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with a defective AI artifact to cause harm (as with the distracted driver in
80
the Uber case discussed below, where the driver was using her mobile
81
phone at the time of the crash).
For purposes of analytic clarity, a simplified liability chain is offered
here to focus more precisely on three primary types of actors in connection
82
with products constituting AI artifacts: innovators, providers, and users.
Under this scheme, products liability theories would apply only to innovators and providers in relation to defective AI artifacts. Although separated
here for analytical purposes, it is important to bear in mind that the development of AI artifacts can be achieved through either centralized or highly
distributed processes. In practice, a single company even could play all
three roles—innovating, producing, and using AI artifacts. Google parent
83
company Alphabet’s “moonshot factory,” for example, has internal laboratories designing algorithms for products and services including household
84
85
86
robots, self-driving cars, the detection of kidney disease, quantum com87
88
puting, combating threats to geopolitical instability, and even creating
89
human-level artificial intelligence. All of these various projects provide
feedback, learning, and user information that Alphabet then uses to innovate
further in many different realms.
The development of AI artifacts proceeds through a variety of highly
discrete actors who may range from high school students to professionals,
with coding taking place in settings as diverse as corporate plants, garages,
and even dorm rooms. These actors may participate in the development pro-

80.
See infra notes 98–100 and accompanying text.
81.
See, e.g., Tom Krisher, Safety Agency Says Distracted Driver Caused Fatal Uber
Crash, U.S. NEWS (Nov. 18, 2019, 11:51 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/business
/articles/2019-11-19/official-safety-lacking-before-uber-self-driving-car-crash.
82.
These terms were defined above. See supra p. 62.
83.
See Dereck Thompson, Google X and the Science of Radical Creativity, ATLANTIC
(Nov. 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/11/x-google-moonshotfactory/540648 (discussing Alphabet’s “moonshot factory”).
84.
E.g., Tom Simonite, Alphabet’s Dream of an ‘Everyday Robot’ Is Just Out of
Reach, WIRED (Nov. 21, 2019, 1:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/alphabets-dreameveryday-robot-out-reach (innovation on general purpose robots who could be tasked anything from helping the elderly to sorting trash).
85.
E.g., Andrew J. Hawkins, Inside Waymo’s Strategy to Grow the Best Brains for
Self-Driving Cars, VERGE (May 9, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com
/2018/5/9/17307156/google-waymo-driverless-cars-deep-learning-neural-net-interview.
86.
E.g., Tom Simonite & Gregory Barber, Alphabet’s AI Might Be Able to Predict
Kidney Disease, WIRED (July 31, 2019, 1:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/alphabets-aipredict-kidney-disease.
87.
E.g.,
Quantum,
GOOGLE
RSCH.,
https://research.google/teams/appliedscience/quantum (last visited Feb. 15, 2020).
88.
E.g., Jigsaw, GOOGLE, https://jigsaw.google.com (last visited Feb. 15, 2020).
89.
E.g., Jeremy Kahn, Inside Big Tech’s Quest for Human-Level A.I., FORTUNE (Jan.
20, 2020, 3:30 AM), https://fortune.com/longform/ai-artificial-intelligence-big-techmicrosoft-alphabet-openai.
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cess through a broad range of ventures, belonging to different organizations
or no organizations at all—even contributing anonymously. The contributions may involve discrete work and custom designed code or modifications
of AI components developed by others contained in open-source libraries.
All of this builds considerable opacity into the operations of complex systems powered by AI artifacts, especially where the interactions of the various AI components are not fully understood or transparent to users or regulators, or even to the innovators creating them or the providers bringing
90
them to market.
The three AI value chain categories mapped against the traditional
products liability categories appear in Table 2.

90.
See Scherer, supra note 30, at 369–72 (discussing diversity, diffusion, discretion
and opacity in AI development).
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Table 2. AI Value Chain Categories Mapped Against
Traditional Liability Categories.
Value Chain for
AI Artifacts

Innovator

Products
Liability
Distribution
Chain
Designer/
Creator of
component parts
Product
Manufacturer

Provider

Function

Example

Creates algorithms
and
AI systems
Assembles products
incorporating AI
systems &
algorithms as
components

AI flight
navigation
system
Flying
packagedelivery drone

Product
Distributor

Final “product prep”
and assembly, incl.
instructions &
warnings; training
users

Drone dealer—
helps buyers
select needed
features &
instructs on safe
operation

Product Owner

Uses the product to
fulfill a certain
business or personal
need/desire

Amazon
(or a similar
company)

Product
Operator

Operating/
controlling product at
the time injury
occurs

Drone
delivery “pilot”
hired by
Amazon—
employee or
sub-contractor

User

Some have suggested an additional player for products liability claims
specific to AI: allowing claims against the AI artifact itself or against a
product incorporating that artifact. For example, if my friend’s butler robot
crushes my fingers when it returns my car keys after dinner, I could sue the
robot itself—just as I would a human being. Such proposals include things
like giving AI artifacts formal legal personality, similar to the type given to
91
corporations that enable them to be sued in courts, or even more broadly
conceiving of AI algorithms as “citizens,” which would create duties for in-

91.
David C. Vladeck, Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules and Artificial Intelligence, 89 WASH. L. REV. 117, 124 (2014) (“there is no a priori reason why truly autonomous machines should not be accorded some formal legal status, making them, like corporations and certain trusts, ‘persons’ in the eyes of the law and thus subject to suit.”).
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novators and providers to “‘raise’ their AIs to act as responsible, productive
92
members of society.”
This category is not considered here for two reasons. First, while theo93
retically intriguing, this category of liability is not yet recognized in law
and thus is of little help to innovators and providers making decisions in today’s uncertain environment. Second, these categorizations are conceptually
dissimilar to the other participants in the value chain. They often amount to
semantic shorthand for a risk-shifting policy mandate (e.g., requiring insurance on self-driving cars that moves with the vehicle itself, thus enabling
94
the crash victims to “sue the car” in order to access the insurance). Even
the “algorithm as citizen” notion really amounts to a mandate for companies
to design their AI responsibly and to ensure that their creations do not
breach important social covenants.

B. AI Artifacts and the Internet of Things
The linkage of AI artifacts and the kinetic world through the IoT has the
potential to drastically change our conception of what exactly the “product”
in “product liability” is. The IoT takes the virtual world and makes it tangible. Consider just the problem presented by the more than 278 million pas95
senger cars on the road today in the United States. Modern cars contain
50–100 sensors constantly monitoring and recording everything from speed
96
and fuel consumption to tire pressure. The failure of any number of these
instruments, or certain combinations of failures, could cause an accident and
personal injury to the driver, passengers, or other motorists or pedestrians.
That said, when there is an instrument failure, the root cause of an accident
relating to the device failure in question often is traceable back to a particu97
lar component part or that part’s manufacturer.
The harder challenge arises not when a sophisticated component is
physically defective, but rather when there is either a problem with the AI
artifact operating that component or when AI software interacts with that

92.
ACCENTURE,
TECHNOLOGY
VISION
FOR
ORACLE
5
(2018),
https://www.accenture.com/_acnmedia/PDF-77/Accenture-Technology-Vision-Oracle-2018.
93.
As the court noted in United States v. Athlone Industries, Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 979
(3d Cir. 1984), “robots cannot be sued, but they can cause devastating damage,” such that “the
defendant . . . was twice sued as the ultimate responsible distributor for various violations of
the Consumer Product Safety Act.”
94.
Vladeck, supra note 91, at 124 n.27.
95.
Nathan Bomey, Old Cars Everywhere: Average Vehicle Age Hits All-Time High,
USA TODAY (June 28, 2019, 1:06 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars
/2019/06/28/average-vehicle-age-ihs-markit/1593764001.
96.
J. Murgoitio & J. I. Fernández, Car Driver Monitoring by Networking Vital Data,
in ADVANCED MICROSYSTEMS FOR AUTOMOTIVE APPLICATIONS 37, 38 (Jürgen Valldorf &
Wolfgang Gessner eds., 2008).
97.
See, e.g., in re Takata Airbag Prods. Liab. Litig., 396 F. Supp. 3d 1101 (S.D. Fla.
2019) (consolidated class action claims arising out of defective airbags installed in vehicles).
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component in a way that makes it behave in an unexpected manner. In such
complex systems, “[t]he various component parts and their respective roles
in causing a malfunction may be hard to discern and separate for the pur98
pose of assigning responsibility.”
This is not to suggest that AI-related causation—and the interaction between AI artifacts and physical components—can never be proven. For example, a self-driving Uber SUV that struck and killed a pedestrian in Tempe, Arizona, in March 2018 was equipped with a camera as well as radar
99
and LIDAR systems. These components worked properly at the time of the
accident, but the algorithm running them did not recognize a woman walking across the street with her bicycle outside of a crosswalk as a jaywalking
pedestrian, and thus did not activate the braking system until it was too late
100
to stop. In a similar situation, a man was killed in a Tesla vehicle operating in auto-pilot mode when the vehicle struck an eighteen-wheeler after the
101
system failed to distinguish the white truck from the bright sky. Neither of
these vehicles was truly autonomous, and thus both would be classified as
augmentation AI as they both provided driver assistance, rather than being
trusted to do all of the actual driving.
In both of these instances, the AI operating the self-driving vehicle was
found to be at fault for the crash. The problems with the AI artifacts in ques102
tion were identified by government agencies tasked with post-accident

98.
Gary E. Marchant & Rachel A. Lindor, The Coming Collision Between Autonomous Vehicles and the Liability System, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1321, 1328 (2012) (discussing autonomous vehicle systems).
99.
Richard Gonzales, Feds Say Self-Driving Uber SUV Did Not Recognize Jaywalking
Pedestrian in Fatal Crash, NPR (Nov. 7, 2019, 10:57 PM), https://www.npr.org
/2019/11/07/777438412/feds-say-self-driving-uber-suv-did-not-recognize-jaywalkingpedestrian-in-fatal-.
100.
NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., VEHICLE AUTOMATION REPORT, TEMPE, AZ, NTSB
NO. AZ-HWY-18-MH-010, 11–12 (2019), https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/62500-62999
/62978/629713.pdf; see also Hannah Knowles, Uber’s Self-Driving Cars Had a Major Flaw:
They Weren’t Programmed to Stop for Jaywalkers, WASH. POST (Nov. 6, 2019, 10:06 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/transportation/2019/11/06/ubers-self-driving-cars-hadmajor-flaw-they-werent-programmed-stop-jaywalkers. A separate lawsuit was brought against
the city for allegedly creating the appearance of a safe crossing area that led directly into traffic. Patrick O’Grady, Tempe Faces $10M Suit in Uber Self-Driving Death, PHX. BUS. J. (Feb
3, 2019, 9:00 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/phoenix/news/2019/02/03/tempe-faces-10msuit-in-uber-self-driving-death.html.
101.
Danny Yadron & Dan Tynan, Tesla Driver Dies in First Fatal Crash While Using
Autopilot Mode, GUARDIAN (June 30, 2016, 7:14 PM), https://www.theguardian.com
/technology/2016/jun/30/tesla-autopilot-death-self-driving-car-elon-musk. Two other accidents involving Tesla’s auto-drive feature are under investigation at the time of writing. Alexander B. Lemann, Autonomous Vehicles, Technological Progress, and the Scope Problem in
Products Liability, 12 J. TORT L. 157, 169–70 (2019) (providing details of two other Tesla
crashes).
102.
Major IoT risks—both of which seem to apply to the Uber and Tesla crashes—
involve “sensor perception and decision-making under conditions of uncertainty.” See Mat-
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investigation. The full power of the U.S. government—acting through the
National Transportation Safety Board’s investigatory branches —was
brought to bear in sorting out causation. Establishing the root causes of alleged failures by AI artifacts in cases that do not command the attention of
powerful government agencies will be a much harder and more costly prop103
osition.
Although the AI artifacts often will be involved in IoT-powered device
104
failures, proving exactly what went wrong with an AI artifact will become
increasingly difficult as its complexity increases. Traditional concepts of
foreseeability already are hard to apply because “an AI system’s solution
may deviate substantially from the solution typically produced by human
cognitive processes. The AI’s solution thus may not have been foreseeable
105
to a human — even the human that designed the AI.” And these are just
the problems that exist with machine learning around narrowly defined but
still complex tasks (e.g., processing data from a combination of radar,
LIDAR, and camera inputs and ascertaining whether a vehicle should suddenly brake because a pedestrian or large truck lies is in the way). The problem will become exponentially worse as AI transitions from automation and
augmentation and AI autonomy becomes a reality:
[T]he possibility that an autonomous system will make choices other than those predicted and encouraged by its programmers is inherent in the claim that it is autonomous. If it has sufficient autonomy that it learns from its experience and surroundings then it may
make decisions which reflect these as much, or more than, its initial
programming. The more the system is autonomous then the more it
has the capacity to make choices other than those predicted or en106
couraged by its programmers.

thew Michaels Moore & Beverly Lu, Autonomous Vehicles for Personal Transport: A Technology Assessment (June 2, 2011), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1865047.
103.
See Kyle Graham, Of Frightened Horses and Autonomous Vehicles: Tort Law and
Its Assimilation of Innovations, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1241, 1270 (2012) (“For a plaintiff
to reach a jury on a design-defect claim, she may have to engage in a searching review of the
computer code that directs the movement of these vehicles. This project may be difficult, and
expensive.”).
104.
See, e.g., Marchant & Lindor, supra note 98, at 1328 (noting, for example, that “the
malfunction in an autonomous vehicle will usually be a programming error or system failure.”).
105.
Scherer, supra note 30, at 365.
106.
Robert Sparrow, Killer Robots, 24 J. APPLIED PHIL. 62, 70 (2007) (discussing AI in
the context of LAWS—Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems). See also Scherer, supra note
30, at 365 (noting that “the development of more versatile AI systems combined with advances in machine learning make it all but certain that issues pertaining to unforeseeable AI behavior will crop up with increasing frequency and that the unexpectedness of AI behavior will
rise significantly.”).
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Causation may be even more difficult to establish in the not-too-distant
future where AI artifacts become intimately involved in creating other AI
artifacts along with designing and building other products that cause injury
107
after release into the stream of commerce.
Although cases involving AI artifacts certainly will be novel—
particularly with autonomous AI—the use of traditional strict products liability principles to determine liability and set compensation in such cases is
sound as a matter of public policy. Innovators and providers utilizing AI ar108
tifacts have special duties to society as a whole. The major justification
for imposing strict liability is that these actors are in the best position to
avoid the potential for harm in the first place and subsequently to pass on
109
and spread the cost of compensating victims for their injuries.
That said, it is important to note that the theoretical linkage between
fault, prevention, and payments for injuries is at best imperfect. When multiple tortfeasors create a single indivisible harm (which usually is the case
when a defective product hurts someone), the law generally holds each of
them “jointly and severally liable.” This means that the injured party can
recover the full amount of damages from any of them, regardless of that in110
dividual defendant’s actual percentage of fault. Plaintiffs’ lawyers thus
will seek to assert claims against all companies or individuals involved—
however slightly—in the creation and delivery chain that brought the defective product into contact with the injured party.
The plaintiff’s lawyer’s target zone thus will include all identifiable innovators, providers, and users that can be linked to the injury in question.
Note also that with sophisticated products, such as self-driving cars, there
may be multiple parties in each category—numerous AI innovators whose
algorithms and systems are incorporated into an AI artifact created by a
provider that in turn may be aggregated with other products in the activities
of given owners or operators.
107.
In a statement more rhetorical flourish than realistic description, Tesla’s Elon Musk
has called his largely automated manufacturing facility (the Gigafactory) a “machine that
builds the machine.” Elon Musk, CEO of Tesla, Inc., quoted in Sean O’Kane, Tesla Will Live
and Die by the Gigafactory, VERGE (Nov. 30, 2018, 10:01 AM), https://www.theverge.com
/transportation/2018/11/30/18118451/tesla-gigafactory-nevada-video-elon-musk-jobs-model3.
108.
“The basis for the rule is the ancient one of the special responsibility for the safety
of the public undertaken by one who enters into the business of supplying human beings with
products which may endanger the safety of their persons and property, and the forced reliance
upon that undertaking on the part of those who purchase such goods.”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1)(b) cmt. f.
109.
See, e.g., Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1165–69 (Cal. 1978) (discussing policy justifications for strict liability).
110.
See, e.g., Chase v. Roy, 363 N.E.2d 402, 408 (Mass. 1973) (“[I]f two or more
wrongdoers negligently contribute to the personal injury of another by their several acts,
which operate concurrently, so that in effect the damages suffered are rendered inseparable,
they are jointly and severally liable.”).
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111

In any case, once a presumably-blameless injured plaintiff is fully
compensated, all of the various defendants then will assert legal claims
against each other to apportion damages based on each defendant’s relative
112
contribution to the overall harm. Such contribution and indemnity claims
have significant limitations. A party that had a minimal role in the product
containing the defective AI artifact but which is financially well-heeled can
be left holding the proverbial bag for the entire group if the other defendants
lack insurance, go bankrupt, or benefit from a statutory liability cap—as in
113
the case of many universities —that make them unable to contribute their
pro rata share.

IV. Implications for the Development and Deployment of
AI Artifacts
A. Liability Implications—Impacts on AI Innovation
As discussed above, in addition to the three actors (innovators, providers, and users) in the value chain for AI artifacts, AI also can be characterized based on its level of sophistication. AI autonomy is markedly different
than automation and augmentation. The key value proposition of autonomy
is the machine’s ability to learn from its environment and make its own decisions based on a wide variety of inputs. But its inherent unpredictability
works against the players in the AI value chain because its autonomy also
means that unexpected things can go wrong at unexpected times and in unexpected ways. Put more colloquially, and quoting former U.S. Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld: “There are known knowns. There are things we
know that we know. There are known unknowns. That is to say, there are
things that we now know we don’t know. But there are also unknown un114
knowns. There are things we do not know we don’t know.”
The liability matrix appears as set out in Table 3.
111.
A plaintiff’s recovery may be reduced or even barred outright if the plaintiff is at
fault for their own harm. See, e.g., Linda J. Rusch, Products Liability Trapped by History:
Our Choice of Rules Rules Our Choices, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 739, 752 (2003) (“The defenses of
contributory or comparative responsibility, assumption of the risk and product misuse are also
used in strict liability cases.”) (internal citations omitted). Product alteration also may bar recovery. See, e.g., Davis v. Berwind Corp., 690 A.2d 186, 190–91 (Pa. 1997) (holding that the
removal of a safety device sufficiently altered the product to act as supervening cause of injury that relieved manufacturer of liability). But these kinds of misuse themselves are subject to
a foreseeability test. See, e.g., Hall v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 363
(E.D.N.Y. 1972) (“A manufacturer cannot ignore a probable ‘misuse’ of his product.”).
112.
See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231B, § 1 (West 2017).
113.
See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231B, § 85K (West 2017) (limiting liability of
non-health care charitable organizations to $20,000).
114.
Donald Rumsfeld, Sec’y of Def., News Briefing (Feb. 12, 2002), quoted in David
C. Logan, Known Knowns, Known Unknowns, Unknown Unknowns and the Propagation of
Scientific Enquiry, 60 J. EXPER. BOTANY 712, 712 (2009).
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Table 3. Liability Matrix for AI Innovators,
Providers, and Users.
Value Chain
for
AI Artifacts

Innovator

Provider

User

Automation
(Known
Unknowns)

Augmentation
(Known
Unknowns)

Autonomy
(Unknown
Unknowns)

Design nondefective AI
(“state of the
art” quality);
“manufacture”
algorithms to
design
standards.

Known pathways
and defined
characteristics;
can predict error
rates & types.

Design based on
known
interactions with
human operators
(e.g., surgical
robot).

Machine
learning based
on unknown
interactions &
environments.

Manufacture AI
artifacts to
design
standards;
instruct in the
proper use;
warn against
foreseeable
misuses—may
be duty to make
product
unmodifiable.
Operate
according to
instructions;
make
authorized
modifications
only.

Predictable
operations and
intersections
between AI and
tactile world.

Defined uses—
types of injuries
can be predicted
based on known
purpose of the
augmentation.

End uses may be
undefined and
unknown at the
time of
manufacture and
sale and may
change over
time.

Known risk of
modification
(e.g., removal of
safety device).

Known
interactions
between human
and technology;
training &
instructions to
mitigate harms.

Unknown
multitude of
potential users
and types of
interactions;
unclear
authorized
versus
unauthorized
modifications.

Legal Duties

The “known unknowns” are relatively easy cases because the role of the
AI is limited and error rates and types can be predicted. A factory robot that
punches three holes in a metal plate, rotates it 90 degrees, and moves it 12.5
centimeters to the left behaves in a fairly predictable way. If it moves 12.5
centimeters to the right, causing a machine to jam and subsequently break
apart, injuring the operator, liability can be established in a fairly straightforward manner. Indeed, statistics from the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration indicate that “‘dumb robots,’ designed for repetitive tasks
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that are dirty, dangerous or dull,” are known to kill one to two factory
115
workers per year in the United States.
Likewise, for example, with surgical AI augmentation for a human doctor. If a robot that is supposed to move only two millimeters instead moves
five, severing an artery instead of a ligament, we can determine what went
wrong with relative ease after we factor in the doctor’s conduct and whether
116
she met the standards of a reasonable medical professional in conducting
117
the robotic-assisted surgery. And, as noted above, investigators have been
able to determine what happened in those accidents involving the semi118
autonomous Uber and Tesla vehicles.
The real problem rests with AI autonomy. When an AI artifact causes
physical harm that can be traced back to an unknown unknown, or even an
unknowable one, assuming that accurate forensic analysis is even possible,
who should bear the costs? In the autonomy zone, the AI artifact teaches itself and learns from its unique environment. It therefore may prove nearly
impossible for innovators, providers, and users to predict the types of errors
that could occur, the frequency of those errors, whether one error might cascade in a complex system and cause other types of errors, and the ultimate
type and magnitude of harm that might arise. This means that the usual legal
paradigms—focused on ensuring that innovators, providers, and users guard
against foreseeable risks in design and manufacture and warn against foreseeable misuses when those risks cannot be avoided—are of little help in
determining legal responsibility. This is a problem for all three actors, as the
harm often will prove indivisible, and thus very difficult—as a forensic matter—to trace back to one particular source.
It is extremely difficult to discover whether software, as opposed to
hardware, is responsible for the glitch that led to an accident. If the
software is responsible, it would be hard to determine whether the
precise cause was the operating system or the application (and, if
the latter, which application). This analysis is all the more difficult

115.
John Markoff & Claire Cain Miller, As Robotics Advances, Worries of Killer Robots Rise, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/17/upshot/dangerrobots-working.html.
116.
See, e.g., Sargis v. Donahue, 65 A.3d 20, 25 (Conn. App. Ct. 2013) (quoting
Mcchietto v. Keggi, 930 A.2d 817, 821 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007)) (“[T]o prevail in
a medical malpractice action, the plaintiff must prove (1) the requisite standard of care for
treatment, (2) a deviation from that standard of care, and (3) a causal connection between the
deviation and the claimed injury”).
117.
See, e.g., Balding v. Tarter, No. 4-12-1030, 2013 WL 4711723, at *1 (Ill. App. Ct.
Aug. 29, 2013) (denying appeal of summary judgment awarded to physician in medical malpractice case alleging that plaintiff suffered nerve damage to patient during laparoscopic robotic-assisted prostatectomy due to the surgeon’s lack of familiarity with robotic procedures,
and hence excessive time necessary to perform the procedure).
118.
See supra notes 99–101 and accompanying text.
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where the software is open source (since no single author is respon119
sible) and the hardware can be easily modified.
Further complications arise with foreseeability when an AI artifact is
modified, customized, or “taught” to behave in certain ways “because the
manufacturer could not necessarily anticipate the universe of potential problems that might stem from third-party innovation and provide warnings or
120
modify the platform design in response.
Several important consequences follow. First, it is fanciful to suggest
that simply because harm is unforeseeable, innovators, providers, and users
would not be held liable for injuries caused by autonomous AI artifacts.
From a policy perspective, AI value chain participants will be perceived—
rightly or wrongly—as having created the problem in the first place, as best
positioned to prevent accidents (or at least reduce their frequency and
costs), and as having the most resources available to compensate injured
121
parties.
As a legal matter, all innovators and providers involved most likely will
be held liable in the absence of a legislative mandate or regulatory scheme
122
that creates immunity. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (Latin for “the
thing speaks for itself”) aids injured plaintiffs in situations where the precise
source of their harm is unclear but control of the harm-causing mechanisms
123
rests exclusively in the hands of others. In these cases, courts “infer a defect of some kind on the theory that the accident itself is proof of defect,
124
even if there is compelling evidence that cuts against a defect theory.”
A related consequence is that the risks associated with autonomous AI
artifacts may prove impossible—or prohibitively expensive—to insure. After all, insurance is predicated on actuarial tables that predict the likelihood
of events based in part on historical occurrences. But with autonomous AI,
there are no precedent scenarios, and there is much opacity around causa-

119.
M. Ryan Calo, Open Robotics, 70 MD. L. REV. 571, 597 (2011) (internal citations
omitted).
120.
Id. at 596.
121.
E.g., Amar Kumar Moolayil, The Modern Trolley Problem: Ethical and Economically-Sound Liability Schemes for Autonomous Vehicles, 9 CASE W. RES. J. L. & TECH. 1, 20
(2018) (discussing these issues in the context of self-driving cars).
122.
For example, Internet service providers benefit from an immunity from liability for
defamation and related claims arising out of material posted on their websites. Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012) (safe harbor provision immunizing Internet
service providers from liability for third-party content posted on their websites). That said, it
is unlikely that the public would stand for similar limitations on liability for innovators or
providers of AI artifacts if physical injuries and property damage were at issue.
123.
See, e.g., Moussa & Windle, supra note 69, at 78 (discussing application of res ipsa
loquitur to AI failures).
124.
Vladeck, supra note 91, at 128; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD.
LIAB. § 3(a) (res ipsa loquitur may apply where a product’s failure “was of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a product defect”).
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tion, applicable theories of liability, event frequency, and overall damages.
This likely will deter all but the most adventurous insurers from entering the
market, at least until some of these parameters become known and thus predictable for assessing casualty rates, experience histories, and premium calculations. This in turn requires innovators, providers, and users of AI artifacts to retain considerable risk in their operations. Two market-facing
consequences are likely to follow.
First, the risks may discourage smaller players, such as entrepreneurs,
from entering the market or force existing participants to leave. Things may
change once the liability rules are clarified, but for now, the potential for
catastrophic liability may leave the field dominated by only one type of
company: well-heeled corporations that can absorb considerable losses and
self-insure against such risks, such as Google, Apple, Facebook, IBM, or
large manufacturing companies like the “Big 3” automakers in the United
125
States. This, in turn, may limit the types of AI developed to those that suit
the interests of large technology companies, instead of the greater good—or
at least other types of AI suited to smaller, more entrepreneurial ventures.
Second, the enhanced risk may discourage investment in AI ventures or
require a higher return. This will deter entrepreneurship and limit the spectrum of AI investment to financiers capable of withstanding greater losses.
It also may impact the valuation of existing AI companies and the market
for buying and selling them. Again, larger incumbent players will likely
have a considerable advantage.
In the business-to-business context, where consumer protection con126
cerns do not limit liability disclaimers, it is likely that companies facing
uncertain sources and degrees of liability will seek to protect themselves by
allocating liability elsewhere in the value chain through the contracting process. The parties may say, in effect, “I don’t think this will happen, as I have
a good product, but I don’t know for sure, so if something unexpected does
happen, I want you to pay for it.” For example, a provider may seek in its

125.
See Parker O’very, 3 Ways Self-Driving Cars Will Affect the Insurance Industry,
VENTURE BEAT (Jan. 26, 2018), https://venturebeat.com/2018/01/26/3-ways-self-drivingcars-will-affect-the-insurance-industry (noting that “Google, Volvo, and Mercedes-Benz already accept liability in cases where a vehicle’s self-driving system is at fault for a crash” and
that “Tesla is taking things a step further by extending an insurance program to purchasers of
Tesla vehicles.”). The larger market impacts on the insurance industry itself are likely to be
significant. See, e.g., Paul Tullis, Self-Driving Cars Might Kill Auto Insurance as We Know It,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-19
/autonomous-vehicles-may-one-day-kill-car-insurance-as-we-know-it.
126.
See, e.g., Sarah Denis, Using the Class Action Fairness Act as a Loophole Around
the Magnuson Moss’s Jurisdictional Requirements, 19 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 124, 125
(2016) (noting that “Congress enacted the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301
et seq. (2015), with the purpose of protecting consumers from deceptive warranty practices,
specifically, narrow consumer product warranties that were often too convoluted for a layperson to understand.”).
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purchase of an AI algorithm (perhaps structured as an IP license) to allocate
all risks of harm caused by products containing that algorithm to the innova127
tor who created it. The innovator likely would prefer things the other way.
In automation and augmentation settings, the issue can be resolved with insurance because a carrier can predict and model potential losses. The inability to do so in autonomy seems to suggest that the risk itself will be uninsurable, or perhaps only insurable at an unaffordable rate. Contracting will
be further complicated by the inherent difficulty in valuing these defense
and indemnity allocations, in that calculating the risk premium for these
contract terms presents the same problems faced by insurers noted above.
This process will tend to favor players with market dominance, although unlike situations involving third-party liability, this does not automatically mean the largest and most financially powerful companies. A
small innovator holding patents and other exclusive rights to a badly-needed
technology can extract considerable monopoly-like concessions from providers seeking to create new products for fickle customers. The weakest
party in the chain—in relative terms—could end up being stuck with one
hundred percent of the liability if things go wrong. Again, this could impact
entrepreneurship and the types of players willing to participate in the AI
market.
The situation may also transform the very nature of the relationship between value chain participants. With autonomous AI, it may be impossible
for parties to conclude bargained-for one-off transactions (or a series of
them) for AI technology for at least two reasons. First, an algorithm never
wears out or expires in the way that a mechanical device does. Errant AI incorporated into products may be blamed for unpredicted injuries many years
or even decades later, particularly as other innovators and providers in the
AI artifact’s distribution chain exhaust any available insurance or go out of

127.
An important part of software contracting involves controlling costs by limiting the
liability of software developers for consequential damages arising from software errors. See,
e.g., David R. Collins, Shrinkwrap, Clickwrap, and Other Software License Agreements: Litigating a Digital Pig in a Poke in West Virginia, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 531, 539 (2009) (“Because an entire company may rely on only one software program to conduct business, permitting recovery for products liability without limitation can potentially hold a developer liable
for consequential damages amounting to millions or even billions of dollars for a single copy
of a software product.”). Subsequent users of algorithms or software (e.g., those incorporating
AI artifacts into their products and services) become bound by any liability provisions in the
original distribution end-user license because any other use exceeds the license itself. See also
Christian H. Nadan, Software Licensing in the 21st Century: Are Software “Licenses” Really
Sales, and How Will the Software Industry Respond?, 32 AIPLA Q.J. 555, 588 (2004) (noting
that “[i]f the distributor does pass on the end user license, the end user becomes bound by the
liability limiting contract terms in the end user license. In this way, liability-limiting contract
terms—even though not themselves license limitations—can pass down the distribution channel with the software copy.”).
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128

business. This may transform the nature of the dealings between the various parties in the chain into much more of an ongoing relationship with a
longer-term perspective.
Second, the specter of indivisible liability will encourage innovators,
providers, and users to work collaboratively on an ongoing basis to prevent
harm in the first place. The roles create a feedback loop from innovation
down to end-user and back again as the AI-enabled product learns with experience. Even where defense and indemnity are shiftable by contract, it often will prove far less expensive for the players to collaboratively repair
problems discovered in AI artifacts than to incur the litigation costs of defending cases brought by injured third parties. Bad press has its own costs,
and as a practical matter an indemnity clause in an IP licensing agreement
may do little to restore a company’s damaged reputation.
The need to cooperate also may force the parties to engage in different
types of future transactions aimed at minimizing third-party liability. These
could include duties to gather and retain information that will enable the
parties to sort out responsibility amongst themselves if an unexpected event
does occur. This may be harder than it sounds in practice, potentially creating additional challenges in complying with consumer privacy laws, government reporting obligations, maintaining trade secrets, and the like, not to
mention adherence to contractual provisions that require it.
Cooperation also may require companies to make different design
choices in the first place—for example, building reversibility into their AI
that will allow them to undo undesirable learning by their algorithms or oth129
erwise accounts for unexpected events, or designing processes that enable
querying the AI system and increase accountability without revealing the
130
inner workings of the system itself. This might increase costs, slow down
the development pipeline, and make complex systems even more cumbersome. Again, the transformation of the dealings between the various parties

128.
The nature and magnitude of liability certainly may be impacted by statutes of limitation (generally premised on the date that an injury occurs or upon which it is discovered).
See, e.g., Richard C. Ausness, Replacing Strict Liability with a Contract-Based Products Liability Regime, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 171, 173 (1998) (noting that statutes of limitation in tort cases “begin to run when the plaintiff’s injury occurs, or in some cases, when the injury is discovered”). Certain industries also may lobby for special statutes of repose for their products,
which time-limit claims to a period that begins to run on the date of first sale or transfer. See,
e.g., Montgomery v. Wyeth, 580 F.3d 455, 467 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that claims were
barred under statute of repose that required claims against pharmaceutical companies to be
brought within the shorter of ten years from the date of first sale or within one year after the
drug’s expiration date).
129.
See Lucas D. Introna, Maintaining the Reversibility of Foldings: Making the Ethics
(Politics) of Information Technology Visible, 9 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 11, 21 (2007).
130.
See Finale Doshi-Velez et al., Accountability of AI Under the Law: The Role of Explanation (Dec. 20, 2019), https://arxiv.org/abs/1711.01134.
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into an ongoing relationship has implications for the AI value chain as a
whole.
In the absence of an option to spread risk to others, who “wins” in a
contract negotiation depends on a lot of factors—including relative bargaining power, tolerance for risk, the depth of negotiators’ pockets, and ability
to satisfy a judgment if one is assessed. Still, the negotiation process itself
also has its own intrinsic value. It forces the parties to think long and hard
about what might go wrong. Most contracts amount to bargained-for exchange, at least in theory, so the conversation will help to clarify at least
some of the liability risks in a way that regulatory choices categorically allocating liability to one party versus another would not.
A more nuanced understanding of the nature of AI technology allows
managers and executives to identify their organizations’ interests and objectives working with AI solutions as well as their legal liability exposure. This
is particularly important if they are considering transitioning from automation and augmentation AI to autonomous AI. By studying their role(s) in the
AI value chain, organizations can anticipate the nature of their legal exposure. Reframing their risk calculus away from a sole focus on contractual or
tort liability in favor of promoting comprehensive responsibility in organizational behavior may be the most effective approach to mitigate future legal risks in the face of unknowns. Various factors support this argument,
including the evolving nature of AI towards autonomy, the long shelf-life of
digital inventions such as AI artifacts, and the modular nature of digital systems, with AI components that may find their way into a large number of AI
solutions.
To limit their legal liability, organizations should actively foster the responsible development and use of AI innovation. This tenet, while applicable to any technology, is particularly important for AI for several reasons.
First, as noted above, an AI artifact’s lifespan is potentially indefinite. The
digital aspects of AI artifacts do not have the limited shelf-lives associated
with physical decay, and an AI algorithm can be reused and fully or partially incorporated into novel AI systems. Second, AI is not subject to the replicability constraints of physical products; AI code can be replicated a large
number of times at limited marginal cost and find its way into a great many
131
types of AI systems. This greatly magnifies the consequences of error.
Third, the impending evolution of AI systems towards autonomy presents
unforeseeable outcomes. This increases the imperatives on designers, providers, and users to identify and control as much of the downside as possible in the AI context.

131.
As noted above, modification of the AI artifact before incorporation into another
product or process may break the liability chain, provided that the modification itself was not
foreseeable.
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All of this would suggest that companies are incentivized to take great
care in minimizing all possible risks in the development and deployment of
AI artifacts, controlling as much as possible on their own in order to minimize liability. But despite the importance of risk management in AI innovation, a new study of the actual behavior of AI professionals counterintuitively identifies considerable gaps in responsible behavior around AI systems,
which companies should immediately begin to take steps to address.

B. Responsibility Implications—Studying the Ethical Perceptions of
AI Professionals
Individuals with managerial responsibilities for the implementation, design, development, and distribution of AI systems within their organizations, or who are involved in offering such products and services to other
organizations, also fall into the categories of AI innovators, distributors, and
users. Given their understanding of AI technologies, as well as system capabilities and the risks associated with their use, AI professionals serve as
critical participants in the value chain of AI development.
In order to preliminarily explore ethical perceptions of those making
decisions about AI and the level of responsibility in the development of AI
132
innovations, we conducted a brief survey of technology managers and executives who play some role in AI development and who have expertise in
the field of artificial intelligence (designated herein as “AI profession133
als”). The respondent AI professionals answered ten questions about personal and corporate responsibility and ethical behavior within their organizations in the development and deployment of AI technologies.
Eight questions that dealt with the importance of ethical principles and
organizational practices in the ethical development or implementation of
technologies are presented in Table 4, along with the percentages of positive
responses. Overall, we found strong agreement among AI professionals on
these questions. The respondents support the importance of ethical behavior
in the development and implementation of new technologies, contemplate
the potential social harm of their work, and follow ethical principles in their
own development and implementation efforts.
With respect to ethical behavior at the enterprise level, the AI professionals surveyed also consistently report that their organization has written
policies for the socially responsible development and implementation of
new technologies, that these policies are followed, and that the declared
values of their organization agrees with their own. Most also agree that

132.
There is some dispute whether such questions even are possible to answer. See,
e.g., Cade Metz, Is Ethical A.I. Even Possible?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/01/business/ethics-artificial-intelligence.html.
133.
See infra Technical Appendix for details about sample collection, preparation, and
other descriptive statistics, including demographic variables.
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company leadership follows the organization’s stated ethics and values. Finally, a large number of these AI professionals disclose that their organization offers mechanisms to report improper behavior in the development and
implementation of new technologies.

Table 4. Responses to Questions About Ethical Principles and
the Responsible Development of Technologies.
Question

Agree

Q1. Being ethical is highly important in the development
and/or implementation of new technologies.

98.8%

Q2. My organization ensures that its development and/or
implementation of new technologies is done in a socially
responsible manner.

97.56%

Q3. I agree with the declared values of my organization in
relation to the socially responsible development and/or
implementation of new technologies.

95.12%

Q4. I feel a personal obligation to ensure the socially
responsible development and/or implementation of new
technologies.

95.12%

Q5. My organization has written policies relating to the
socially responsible development and/or implementation of
new technologies.

93.90%

Q6. The behavior of my organization’s leaders in relation to
the socially responsible development and/or implementation
of new technologies is consistent with the stated ethics and
values of my organization.

93.90%

Q7. I have the opportunity in my work to consider the wider
social implications of what I am working on and the potential
social harm(s) it could create.

93.90%

Q8. My organization has procedures for reporting improper
behavior in relation to the socially responsible development
and/or implementation of new technologies.

87.80%

Two other questions for AI professionals focused on the scope of their
personal responsibility and their actions to date in terms of reporting any
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concerns relating to the socially responsible use of technologies. These findings are summarized in Table 5.

Table 5. Responses to Questions About Their Ethical
Responsibility and Personal Concerns About the Responsible
Use of Technologies.
Question

Agree

Q9. I see my role as creating, implementing, and/or using the
best technology possible; it is the responsibility of others to
determine how such technology should be used and what
limits should be imposed on it.

90.24%

Q10. Report having personal concerns relating to the socially
responsible use of technology but did not communicate that
concern to supervisors

74.39%
(n=61)

134

The survey results reveal a significant responsibility gap between the
beliefs and the actions of the AI professionals. A large majority of respondents expressed great awareness and concern about the responsible development and use of technology. They also agreed solidly with the values of
their companies in this regard and reaffirmed the importance of ethical behavior, including their own actions, in the development and implementation
of new technologies. Yet less than ten percent of them felt that it was their
personal responsibility to determine the scope of responsible use for the
technologies they build or deploy. Ninety percent of them thought that was
someone else’s job. And it’s clear that these are not theoretical issues; nearly three quarters of the respondents confirmed not reporting to supervisors
actual concerns relating to the socially responsible use of technology in
their organizations. The most frequent justifications for not reporting are
captured in Table 6.

134.
Percentage reflects survey respondents who identified at least one reason for not
communicating ethical concerns to their supervisors. On average, those responding positively
identified 2.32 reasons for not doing so.
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Table 6. Top Reasons for Not Reporting to a Supervisor
Concerns About the Socially Responsible Use of Technology
Reason

Percent (count)

The belief that reporting would not be anonymous

39.34% (24)

The fear of retaliation

36.07% (22)

The belief that someone else would do it

31.15% (19)

The belief that corrective action would not be taken

31.15% (19)

To avoid getting colleague(s) into trouble

26.23% (16)

Out of loyalty to the department or business unit

18.03% (11)

The belief that the issue was not important to
immediate supervisors

16.39% (10)

The belief that it was not part of their job

13.11% (8)

135

As discussed above, in order to minimize legal liability for AI innovations, it would seem that decision-makers leading the innovation and production of AI solutions in modern enterprises have many increased incentives to act responsibly. At a minimum, this means operating under a set of
known organizational values and using clearly defined procedures to identify and address ethical violations. Yet based on these findings, this does not
appear to be happening—at least amongst the AI professionals who participated in the survey.
This study of AI professionals reveals an apparent gap between stated
responsibilities and values and behaviors when managing technology. They
report clear personal and organizational values to minimize negative social
impacts and act ethically in AI development. Yet they do not feel directly
responsible for the actual execution of such responsible behaviors and consistently fail to report ethical concerns. This AI responsibility gap is of great

135.
See infra Technical Appendix for details on the collection and recoding of survey
responses.
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consequence to organizations working or relying on AI innovations, as it
could greatly increase future legal exposure in automation and augmentation as well as autonomy. Given the liability risks inherent in the creation,
deployment, and utilization of AI systems, it is important for organizations
developing and using AI to address this gap—and quickly.
A few clear recommendations and challenges emerge from this study.
First, companies must not only identify clear values and hire individuals
who share those principles, but also reframe responsibility in the use and
development of AI innovations to favor a deeper understanding of the social
and legal consequences and a willingness to act based on that understanding.
Second, companies should look beyond short-term economic considerations and immediate outcomes when acting on their AI responsibilities, and
they should train their employees to do so as well. In other words, companies should avoid short-term thinking when evaluating AI systems’ impact
and revenue-oriented metrics of performance that discourage employees
from taking responsible action. Many challenges will arise from short-term
organizational perspectives, particularly in digital companies seeking to
market innovations and generate revenue quickly, especially given the unforeseeable legal liabilities that their AI innovations may create in the long
term. While this change in perspective may be difficult to achieve and requires further research, it is one that companies should seek to encode in
their organizations’ actions as well as their vision statements and operational guidelines. This is especially important because algorithms do not “wear
out” like tangible objects do, such that the applicable time horizon in which
harm can arise is far longer. AI managers and executives thus should adopt
a long-term approach in evaluating the consequences of their AI innovations
and products.
Finally, it is important to create an opportunity to fix problems when
they become apparent, especially those problems that could not have been
anticipated beforehand (the “unknown unknowns”). As a matter of company
136
policy, AI innovators and providers should aim to build reversibility and
visibility into AI artifacts so that actions can be undone and to ensure that
the unexpected behavior of the AI system can be explored and better understood. As noted above, all innovators and providers in the AI artifact supply
chain have significant incentives to collaborate with one another in the long
term to investigate and repair “defective” AI artifacts.

V. Concluding Thoughts
The goal of this article was to begin a conversation about legal, ethical,
and managerial responsibility in creating and using AI technologies. Many
136.

See Introna, supra note 129, at 15–23.
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more questions require careful consideration. One of these is how to balance
the various stakeholder interests identified herein from a policy perspective.
Liability for AI participants can inhibit innovation and product development, reduce investment, limit the willingness of owner/operators to purchase AI artifacts in the first place, and tie up resources in legal defense and
cross-claims for indemnity that could be used for other things.
Too much liability will create a drag on the entire AI value chain,
which is the lifeblood of AI advancement. This suggests that some limita137
tions on liability may be appropriate in some circumstances. Yet innovators and producers also clearly need incentives to be as careful as possible in
their design, manufacture, and operational choices, and imposing liability
138
on them clearly advances this goal. The right balance between these competing interests to some extent involves larger questions of social welfare
maximization. Although the degree to which tort law promotes efficient re139
source allocation is an open question, some suggest that the future benefits of AI will far outweigh its costs, even when human life is concerned.
Take the case of autonomous vehicles. How the legal system should attribute responsibility for the crashes that autonomous vehicles cause is an
140
open and hotly debated question. Yet given the prediction that automated
141
vehicles will save thousands of lives per year by eliminating human error,
one author hypothesized “[w]ho cares if Tesla’s Autopilot could have been
improved in some incremental way that would have prevented three fatalities if it can save tens of thousands every year? To the welfare economist,
the appropriate question is not whether Autopilot was “defective,” but rather whether imposing liability will help encourage an efficient allocation of
142
resources.”
These kinds of considerations ultimately may determine the extent to
which individuals will be permitted to recover at all, as well as the measure
143
of damages that will be available. No-fault regimes, such as those pro137.
See, e.g., Calo, supra note 119, 601–12 (discussing selective immunity for robots).
138.
See, e.g., Weston Kowert, Note, The Foreseeability of Human-Artificial Intelligence Interactions, 96 TEX. L. REV. 181, 199 (2017) (noting that if vaccine and automobile
“manufacturers aren’t going to be held liable, then they lose much of their incentive to improve their product.”).
139.
See, e.g., John C. P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513,
544–60 (2003) (discussing various facets of the interpretive and prescriptive economic deterrence theories and critiques of the doctrines).
140.
See Alexander B. Lemann, Autonomous Vehicles, Technological Progress, and the
Scope Problem in Products Liability, 12 J. TORT L. 157, 175–76 (2019).
141.
Id. at 157 (“Autonomous vehicles are widely expected to save tens of thousands of
lives each year by making car crashes attributable to human error – currently the overwhelming majority of fatal crashes – a thing of the past.”).
142.
Id. at 192–93.
143.
It is not uncommon to impose damage limiting schemes in circumstances where the
public interest outweighs that of individual claimants—as in the case of medical malpractice.
See Michael J. Cetra, Damage Control: Statutory Caps on Medical Malpractice Claims, State
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144

posed in Europe for certain AI products, may prove useful, though their
application to various players within the AI value chain has yet to be considered. Insurance pools funded by manufacturing groups also may be worth
145
exploring.
Another option is to consider the pros and cons of leaving the legal gray
area untouched and simply letting courts innovate through the common
146
law. While this would make the AI development landscape harder for
companies to navigate, it has some appeal. This is particularly true because
it can be extraordinarily difficult to achieve correct regulatory solutions ex
ante, especially for rapidly-developing technologies. As Judge Easterbrook
noted in connection with emerging issues of cyberspace in the mid-1990s, a
market-based solution might be best:
“Error in legislation is common, and never more so than when the
technology is galloping forward. Let us not struggle to match an
imperfect legal system to an evolving world that we understand
poorly. Let us instead do what is essential to permit the participants
147
in this evolving world to make their own decisions.”
Much useful dialogue will come simply from helping to ask the right
questions, particularly because autonomous AI will undoubtedly raise
148
unique issues that the law has not yet encountered.

Constitutional Challenges, and Texas’ Proposition 12, 42 DUQ. L. REV. 537, 542–43 (2004)
(discussing state constitutional amendments authorizing state legislatures to cap damages in
medical malpractice cases).
144.
E.g., Roeland de Bruin, Autonomous Intelligent Cars on the European Intersection
of Liability and Privacy – Regulatory Challenges and the Road Ahead, 7 EUR. J. RISK REG.
485, 490 (2016).
145.
Insurance pools may be especially useful in the face of potentially unlimited liability that could leave a company bankrupt. See, e.g., Leonard J. Long, Bankruptcy Lesson of
Future Mass Tort Claims: Potential Mass Tort Victims Should Have Catastrophic Injury Insurance, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 357, 367 (1997) (“[I]f the remedy (principally compensatory
damages for injuries suffered), available to tort victims who suffer catastrophic injury or substantial loss of income is a separately funded insurance pool, then such tort victims are not
dependent on the continued solvency of their tortfeasor and the precarious fortunes of the
bankruptcy process.”).
146.
See, e.g., Marta Katarzyna Kołacz et al., Who Should Regulate Disruptive Technology?, 10 EUR. J. RISK REGUL. 4, 4 (2019) (arguing that the judiciary is best suited to handling
cases presenting risky new technologies whereas regulation was required for technologies
whose risks are not foreseeable at the time of the technological innovation); Brandon W.
Jackson, Artificial Intelligence and the Fog of Innovation: A Deep-Dive on Governance and
the Liability of Autonomous Systems, 35 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 35, 35 (2019) (discussing a significant role for the judiciary in shaping legal regulation of AI).
147.
Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEG. F.
207, 215–16 (1996).
148.
See Jack M. Balkin, The Path of Robotics Law, 6 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 45, 49–51
(2015).
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Technical Appendix
149

The data (n=82) obtained in this study through an online Qualtrics
panel focused exclusively on managers and executive-level employees who
supervised other employees and for whom artificial intelligence technologies were a significant part of their role, educational background, or work
experience. All participants answered all questions in the survey, including
150
for all of the responses discussed above, and the demographic questions
summarized below.
Participants answered survey questions 1–9 as seven-point Likert scale
items, ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”. The positive
151
responses reported in Table 4 and Table 5 correspond to the sum of respondents who selected “strongly agree,” “agree,” or “somewhat agree,” out
of the total number of participants. Survey question 10 (Table 4) allowed
respondents to select multiple items from a list of nine reasons (including
“not applicable,” with a narrative option to provide a reason) for not com152
municating their ethical concerns. Table 5 reflects the number of times
each reason was reported by one of the survey participants, out of the total
number of participants who reported concerns.
The authors calculated descriptive statistics for demographic variables
collected from the sample. Participants average 3.68 years of professional
experience (standard deviation of 1.02 years), and 45.12% of them were
female. All respondents supervised other employees, as summarized in Table 7.

Table 7. Number of Employees Supervised by Participants

149.
150.
151.
152.

Number of Employees Supervised

Percentage

1-9

13.4%

10-99

54.9%

100+

31.7%

Original data from the study remains on file with the authors.
See discussion supra Part IV.
See supra Tables 4–5.
See supra Table 5.
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Industry sectors included leisure and hospitality, professional and business services, and health services (see Table 8 for details).

Table 8. Sectors Represented Among the Technology Managers
and Executives Surveyed
Sector

Number of
Respondents Surveyed

Leisure and Hospitality

29

Professional and Business Services

14

Health Services

10

Trade, Transportation, and Utilities

9

Natural Resources and Mining

7

Construction and Manufacturing

5

Education

3

Other

3

Financial Activities

1

Information Technology

1

The most common company size among those surveyed was 100 to 499
employees, as set forth in Table 9.
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Table 9. Sizes of the Companies of the Technology Managers
and Executives Surveyed
Percentage

Company Size

1 to 9

2.44%

10 to 99

20.73%

100 to 499

32.93%

500 to 999

20.73%

1000+

23.17%

